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I Introduction 
The cla.JJil that some grammatical rules are .lriherently variable 
may seem, at fl.I'St blush, to be so clearly cl.I'Cumscrlbed and 
empirically well-documented as to be rather uncontroversial Why 
would a lmgu.istic theoretician be interested in debating such a 
cla.JJil when it is made by scholars who seem to be worla.ng on the 
fringes of a granmar of a language, scholars whose empirical, 
indeed statistical, evidence usually considered in general 
ll.ngu.l.stic arguroontat1.0n? The ~on, of course, is that propo-
nents of the quantitative paradigm have drawn, from their 
observations, .lmplications which call for a reorganization of 
basic "traditiona1"2 notions 11.ke ~ of a language, 
competence, pertorn:ence, and linguistic intuition. 
The arguments over these basic notions will and should be 
continued, with linguists of both schools usmg empirical evidence 
and logical argumentation to support their cla.ims. But there is 
another arena into which this debate should be carried, an arena 
usually and unfortunately overlooked In this arena, one must 
discover the "frame. of reference" belu.nd the quanti~tive para-
digm and weigh that against the "frame of reference" of 
"traditional" linguistics I have borrowed this term "frame of 
reference" from J Verhaar (1973 362) who means by it the implicit 
elements which always lurk belund what is explicit m a theory 
Wlu.le a theory "sums up what a man thinks, the frame of reference 
is about why he tlunks the way he does." Like Verhaar, I suspect 
that "the 'why' is largely traceable to elernents of a cultural 
nature, and the cultural context becomes understandable (and 
explicit) in a historical perspective " 
In the follc:Ming pages I will undertake the task of expli-
cating the "frames of reference" of both the quantitative 
paradigm and of "traditional" linguistics with the ultimate 
aim of evaluating the claims made by the forner As Verhaar 
suggests, such an explication will force rre into a consideration 
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of the lustory of llnguistic theory m', JJDre precisely, mto 
what Koerner (1972) calls the lustm'iography of l.l.ngu.J.stics 
Smce everyone, :including WeJ.IJreich, Iabov and Herzog (1968) 
(hereafter WI.H) , agrees that the n:::iots of "trach tl.Ol1al" ll.nguJ.Stics 
go deeper than those of the quantitative paradigm, the brunt of 
JI\Y expll.catl.on will be devoted to the "frame of reference" of 
"tradJ. tional" ll.ngw.stics. In particular I will re-examJ.lle the 
roots of m:xlern ll.nguJ.Stic structurall.sm and scrutlll1ze certain 
developnents :in post-Saussurean structuralism all with the hope 
of expll.cat:ing and demonstrating the importance of the 
"traditional" "frame of reference." As such this investigation 
will be an ad.di tion to and a continuation of Koerner' s excellent 
historiographical Wm'k (1973) in which he traces the OZ'J.gm and 
development of Saussure's linguistic thought. 
The :investigation will be arranged m the followJ.ng OZ'der. 
Section II WJ.11 expla.l.n the concept of inherent variabl.lrty and 
WJ.ll present the evidence supporting it. In this sectJ.on, I 
will show that the cluef evidence supporting inherent variabill. ty 
is negative evidence, i.e., the failure of "traditional" 
l.J.ngul.stJ.cs to provide adequate criteria to identify the social 
aspect of language. Smee both the "t:radi tional" theory and, 
in a negative faslu.on, the quantitative paradigm, rest on an 
:interpretation of the "tradl.tional" appn:ach to language as a 
social system. Sectl.on III WJ.1.1 be devoted to an hl.Stm'iograph-
ical study of the "frame of reference" of Sauss~ structuralism, 
especially those aspects of that "frame of reference" which per-
tam to the social nature of language. Section IV WJ.1.1 present 
an evaluation of the quantitative paradigm m the light of that 
hl.Stor10gra.phl.cal study. Section V wJ.11 argue that the concept 
of lllherent variabill.ty is without positive or negative support 
and that solutions to the l.Iladequacies m "tra.ch.tJ.onal" 
l.J.ngul.stics can be found without departmg :from the "frame of 
reference" on wlu.ch "tradl.tional" ll.ngul.stics stands. 
THEORETICAL STATUS OF INHERENT VARIABILITY 
II The Pr111ciple of Inherent Variabilrty 
What clearly dl.st111guishes proponents of the quantitative 
paradigm from advocates of "traditional" l:!.ngw.stics is i.hai. 
the former make a strong claJ.rn. about the nature of human 
capabilrty to control language variation There are, at least 
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four possible cla.J.ms which have been made about the human 
capability to control variation (Wolfram & Fasold 1974 106-111) 
The weakest cla.JJn ( 1) is that humans have ll. ttle capability to 
control language variation, or that ''human beings are capable 
only of discrJJI1J.I1ating which rules are optional and which rules 
are obligatory" (Ibid , p. 106) A stronger position (2) states 
that "the language user recognizes that some rules are variable, 
can identify the factors that favor the operation of the rule, 
and knows the hiei::arclu.cal order of constra11lts" (Ibid , p 107). 
Still stronger is the claim (3) that the user of a language. 
knows wluch features fdvor variabill. ty, what the hierarchy of 
constraint strength is, and also how nuch stronger a higher order 
constra111t is than a lower-order one (Ibid , p 107) 'Ihe 
strongest cla.JJn made ( 4) is that " a speaker can identify 
variable rules, the ll.llgUl.stic factors wluch favor rule operation, 
the hie.rarclu.cal order 111 which they are ranked, the extent to 
which higher order constraints are stronger than lO!Ner order ones, 
and the probabilities toward rule operation contributed by each" 
(Ibid , P• 110). 
The weakest clal.JII. (1), J.f slightly anended to adml.t that 
language users can recognize social/situational constra.J..nts on 
an optional rule, is an adequate statement of the "traditional" 
view This weak claim allows that human lJ.ngUJ.Stic competence 
may be represented by nultiple systems of rules and that 
social circumstances will lead a speaker to perf onn m accordance 
with one or another system of those rules. A change in social 
circumstances may lead to a switching of systems, i.e , code-
SWl. tching. But the rules of each system are 111vari.ant rules. 
Once a particular system or code is selected the speech 
performance will be generally consistent with that code as long 
as the external social circumstances rema11l constant In other 
words there are co-occurrence restrictions on code-switching 
Proponents of the quantitative paradigm support at least 
claJ.rn. (2) and perhaps the stronger cla.JJilS (3) or (4), all of 
which presume a rather highly developed ability to control 
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language varia:tJ.OD. F.ach of these cl.alms (2-4) asS\JJJES that 
human l.l.ngw..stic canpetence is not necessarily categorical but 
nay be variable, i.nheI'entll variable m that the output, for 
arrJ paI'b.cular mput to which the :rule could apply, 16 tm-
predl.ctable. Such a VaI"iable :rule has a structural description 
whl.ch lllcludes the oondl. ti.on that the rule apply with sane 
frequency less than 100%. That frequency of rule applications 
may be l.Ilfluenced by a number of empirically discerm..ble 
llngul.stio and social/situational factors. 
The value of such a VBI"J.able lmgw.stic rule 16 that a 
single structural description with varying fi'equenoies of 
appl.l.cation WJ.ll account for the heterogeneity of lmgw.stic 
elements m the speech m an entire commmity as well as withm 
the mdl.vidual as he mves about that oommuruty. In short, the 
variable :rule and inherent VaI"i.abl.l.i.ty have been postulated to 
solve the problem of representl.Ilg the language system qua social 
system. 
Representl.Ilg language ~ social system has posed a problem 
for ll.nguists ever since W .D.Whitney, H. Paul, and F. de 
Saussure began considering language to be a social lJlStitution. 
The problem 16 t1u.s Language, as a social mstitution, is the 
obJeot of lmgw.stic mvestigation. But if that is so, there 
DDJSt be some empl.I'1Cal criterion for distmgul.slung the social 
aspect of language from psychological and purely idiosyncratic 
aspects of language. The questi.on is what 16 that c:riterJ.on 
wlu.ch isolates the social aspect of language? 
"Tradl. tJ.onal" l.J.nguJ.sts argued that social implies sharl.Ilg, 
and sharing l.DIJ?ll.es the distribution of sane identical mvarJ.ant 
elenents thz:'Oughout the camnmity. The elements shared must be 
invariant slllCe toge#ller they farm the halDgeneous language 
state which constitutes language as a socially shared system. 
The emplrl.cal p:rocedure for dl.stJJlgUl.Slu.ng the social aspect of 
language is to fJJld mvariant elerents or structures. 
Wil:I have reviewed and evaluated the two ma.Jor "tradl.tional11 
approaches which make use of this criterion of l.Ilvariant 
structures, .American s1:nlctualJ.sm and generative transfonna.tJ.onal 
l.J.ngW..stics. In particular, WI1I pomt out that this c:ri terion 
has failed m both approaches. It will 8e worth the wl:u.le to 
exaJl1lile the cri tl.Ol.SDIS ma.de by WlH because those cri tiCJ.SJIIS 
actually constitute the ma.Jor motivation for postulatl.Ilg the 
variable :rule and the notion of mherent variabJ.lJ.ty. 
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American structuralists struggled to find same invariance 
in the speech of members of a language commuruty Recogruzmg 
the obvious variations in speech, Bloomfieldians saw the need to 
hold constant all the sooial factors which masked the homogeneous 
nature of language Social variables could be most easily 
controlled by obviating them 'Ilu.s maant exanuru.ng the language 
of one individual interacting with one other individual, all 
situational factors being held constant. For the purely 
nethodological reason of arriving at invariant speech patterns, 
lmgul.sts studied idiolects rather than trying to directly study 
the language of a coIIBlll.IJUty of speakers As logical as the 
solution seems, there is ample evidence that variation of speech 
appears even within an idiolect (Fries & Pike 1949) • No matter 
how closely the speech situation is controlled, diversity of 
structural units appears even in one individual's speech 
Generative lingu1.st1cs recognized the fact that mvarJ.ailce 
of structure could never be discovered at the level of speech 
Socially shared, homogeneous structures exist, not in actual 
speech patterns, but in the tacit knowledge or intuitions of 
speakers of a language Those structures of language which are 
socially shared could be discovered only by analysis of speaker 
competence, not by exam.im.ng actual utterances Specifically 
a speaker is able to make Judgments about the grammaticality of 
sentences and from those Judgments the analyst is able to 
reconstruct, formally, the nature of the intuition upon which 
those Judgments are based 
But the fact is that Judgments based on intuition are not 
invariant either across individuals and even wrtlUil one 
individual. People are quite capable of reJectmg a sentence 
as ungramma.tical at one moment and accepting- it in the next 
'lhe intuitional Judgments of Just one individual are not in-
variant and therefore the intuitions upon whicJg- the Judgments 
are based are not invariant (Iabov 1972 19lf) Moreover, if 
there are variable intuitions within individuals, the social 
character of language cannot consist in the sharing of some 
invariant set of intuitions 
Neither the structuralist analysis of idiolect nor the 
generative analysis of competence reveals invariant patterns or 
structures either in the cOIIBlll.IJU ty or in the individual How 
then, can we call language a social institution if elements we 
intuitively recognize to be sOCJ.al are neither shared by members, 
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nor possessed by one l.JldJ.vidual m an mvariant farm. 
WIJi argue that the social aspect of language is a pix>blem 
only J.f ong assuoes as H. Paul did, along with ioost JOOdem 
l.lngul.Sts, that an invariant language state is a necessary 
characte.rJ.stic of language as a social institution. On the 
other hand, the problem can be solved if the linguist ignores 
the no'b.on of invariant language state and defines the social 
aspect of language by the cri te?"l..on of shared patterns of 
varia'b.on. It my Well be that lll a ccmm.mity then! l.S no 
mvariant system 111 eqU1.l.l.brium but mther each individual 
possesses and sha.n:?s with others, patterns of variation. Such 
pattenls would of course have escaped the attention of those 
l.:lllgUl.Sts who looked for mvariant shared elements 111 production 
or m canpetence. But they will be observed by one who examnes 
speech far its regularity and p:recb.ctabJ.lJ.ty, the key empll'l.cal 
l.lldl.catOI'S of patter.ns of variation. In other wo;rrjs, quantitativ-
l.Sts argue that one can posit a rule of socially shared granmar 
if one can shaw that 111 a sampling of vernacular speech of 
JJBDbers of a language COD111.m.1.ty the frequency of occurnmce of 
any Ulll.1: covaries with the OC!Cll'A:'ence of specific llnguistic and 
SOC1al factors. '!be cci terion of ?'egularl.ty does not reqm:re 
that ~ one occurrence be p?'edl.ctable from linguistic or social 
factors, only that there l.S some statistical regularJ. ty to the 
unpred.J.ctable occurriences. 'lhe absolute frequency of occurrences 
of any specJ.fic t1lll. t is variable within the incb.vidual and 
hete:r'Ogeneous 111 the cammu.ty. What is predictable and shared 
is the statistical covariatl.011 of frequency of speech output 
with frequency of l.J.nguistic and social fact<ma. 
The cost of this solution l.S that we rell.nqUJ.Sh the long 
held ideas that language as social phencm:ma forms a horoogeneous 
language state and that we fall back on the less strl.llgent clalJll 
that language consJ.Sts, at least 111 part, of shared statistical 
covariat:J..ons. 
Cedergnm and D. Sankoff (1974) have offered some empll'l.cal 
JUStJ.ficatian. far repuchatmg the notl.011 of honogeneous language 
state. '!hey observe that the "traditional" notion of invar.i.ant 
rules of canpetence imp~ the view that human cognitive 
pnx:essJ.Dg l.S categorical. SUch a view, they argue, "ignores 
the extensive psychological lJ.ten:i.ture documenting probabil.l.stfc 
aspects of m:mtal processes such as 'probability matching'"· 
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'Ilu.s citlllg of 'probability matclu.ng' is the only positive 
evidence offered to support the notion of inherent variabilrty 
Yet if the evidence of 'probability rnatchmg' is examined 
carefully, it turns out to be inconclusive and confoundmg, 
hardly a strong support for quantitativists' claims 
521 
Bz:>iefly, 'probability matching' is an observed characteristic 
of human decision ~g such that for a series of varied 
occurrences of X or -X , the predicted probabilities of X come 
to equal the actual probability of the occurrence of X (Lee 1971 
144) There are at least two ways of interpreting the results of 
such 'probability rnatclung' experirnents Mathematical learru.ng 
theory (read the quantitative paradigm) provides the most direct 
interpretation, na:rrely, that subJects calculate a probability 
coefficient prediction for each occurrence of X on the basis of 
previous occurrences The nature of the present remforcement 
will stlJIR.llate a recalculation of a new probability coefficient 
for the forthcoming occurrence A less direct interpretation 
must be rnade by decision theory (read "traditional" view of 
linguistic competence) Initially, the results of 'probability 
rnatching' would seem to falsify a central principle of decision 
theory that subJects will select an optllilal strategy for rnax::umz-
ing the expected number of correct predictions Yet a number of 
inte:r.venmg variables rnay be influenclllg the use of alternative 
strategies for decision making The results of the experiments 
vary witn the number of trials, the number of alternative events, 
the payoffs, and the l.nStructions (Lee 1971 183). Perhaps if the 
sub]ect does not realize that the sequence of occurrences is 
indeed random, he will attempt to discover some strategy behmd 
the series (Lee 1971 150) 
'Probability rnatclung' experirnents neither verify nor 
conclusively falsify either a decision model (categorical 
competence) or a mathematical lear.rung model (variable competence) 
which llllplies probabilistic mental processing "It cannot be 
said that either rnathematical learning theory or decJ.Sion theory 
has proved to be ru.ghly successful in accotmting for the rich 
and often bewildering complexity of experirnental data Neither 
theory has invalidated the other nor is this likely to happen 
(Lee 1971 162) 
We are now in a position to summarize the clalms made by the 
quantitative paradigm and to assess the status of those claims 
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(1) Proponents of lx>th the quantitative paradigm and "traditional" 
11.ngUi.stics agree that language is a social lllStitution yet all 
"tmditional" attempts to docurlent the camun:ity-wide sharmg of 
sone invariant pattems or structures have failed. (2) A central 
tenet of the quantitative paradigm is that previous attempts to 
isolate the social character of language have defaulted :because 
they maintained that shared elements llllSt be categorical elements 
whl.ch together fonn an .invariant language state. '!be social 
aspect of language will not be isolated by looking for invariant 
mtui.tions or speech patterns, but by discovering shared patterns 
of speech vaI'iation. ( 3) 'llu..s criterion denies the "tradJ. tional u 
view that sha:red ll.ngw.stic elements are categorical and m its 
stead postulates the variable roles of gra:mnar. The notion of 
lilherent variability impl.J..es that a speaker has a tacit knowledge 
wch can make sane sort of mathematical calaulation of probab1-
ll.ties of OCCJllI'l"eilC of l.mgul.stic elements. As such the nob.cm. 
of inherent VaI'iabl.lJ.. ty is a less easily falsifiable claim about 
the nature of human cognition than the clal.m that competence is 
categorical. (4) The burden of proof JID.JSt be born by proponents 
of the less easily falsifiable claJ.m. Therefore, the quantitoittwe 
paracb.gm JI111St JI111Ster evidence against the claim that competence 
is categorical. But the only evidence presented to date, ftum 
'probabl.lJ.. ty ma.tch:Lng' , is mconclusive. ( 5) In sunmary, the 
status of the quantitative paradigm is this it is strengthened 
by the inadequacy of "traditional" ap~s to expl.J..cate the 
social character of language, it is weakened by the fact that it 
cannot refute the "t:ntditional" clalm that 1J.ngw.st10 competence 
J.S categorical. 
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III The Impact of Phenomenological Psychology of 
L:mgw.stic Structuralism 
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In the previous section we saw that the quantitative 
paradigm has raised a serious question about the "traditional" 
ll.IlgU.1stic view that shared linguistic structures must be 
categorical and invariant In this section we will delve more 
deeply into that "tre.chtional" notion of invariance and uncover 
the origina.1 motivation for postulating that a language system 
is an invariant socially shared system We will then be in a 
position to assess the "traditional" principle of categorical 
competence and indirectly to assess the denial of that principle 
by the quantitative paradigm 
The search for the sources of the principle of IDVariance 
of socially shared lingw.stic structures brings us directly to 
the taslc of doing a historiography of linguistic structuralism 
As indicated in section I, such an historiography will trace the 
"fram= of reference" belund lmgw.stic structuralism, the 
l.lTIPlicit principles without which the explicit theory could not 
have been framed. Circumscribing the task more narrowly, we 
must focus our investigation on F de Saussure, the ma.JO!' figure 
in the development of linguistic structuralism We must exanune 
Saussure's works to discover his rationale for postulating in-
variant language states The results of such an investigation 
may better enable us to deal with criticisms of that concept 
Before beginning the historiographical investigation we must 
take a noment to review Saussure's work and to discuss the 
difficulties in inteppreting that work F. de Saussure (1857-
1913) was the father of modern structural lmgu.l.stics, but its 
not the case that he invented tne principles of modern linguistics, 
he did not react to 19th century lingw.stics by single nandedly 
fashioning principles for a new ll.IlgU.1stics Rather, it is the 
case that Saussure synthesized unconnected strands of 19th century 
thought which he was heJ.r to. However, that synthesis, reported 
in the Cours de lingw.stique generale, 1916, is difficult to 
interpret being somewhat less than perfectly integrated Two 
reasons account for this ll!lperfect integration (1) The Cours 
de lingu.:;-etique g~erale (hereafter CLJ;) J.S a posthumous --
organization and publication of a sumna:ry of Saussure's general 
linguistic considerations The editors, C Bally and A 
Sechehaye, based theJ.r CLG on students' notes and on Saussure's 
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own mem:>randa for three courses m general lingw.stics which 
Saussure taught in (1907) (1908-1909) and (1910-1911). As such 
the cu; is itself an mterpretation of Saussure's ideas, it 
bequeaths to us at least two problems. understanding the ideas 
of the cu; itself, and cb.stmguishing the aspects of the Cl.G 
which are the results of editorial interpretation fX'Ol!l 1:hose 
aspects wlu.ch n!flect the :real SausSUZ'e. (2) A second reason 
for the J.DJpel'fect mtegration of the Cl.G is that it is really an 
1.Dlfinished work. For most of his academic career, Saussure 
concentn:Lted his attention on particular issues in historical 
J.mgul.Stl.cs. Only in his last years did he begin to work out the 
details of a general linguistic fnamework. There are indications 
m the Cl.G that at the time of his death in 1913 he was still in 
the process of formulating his general linguistics. The Cl.G, 
then, is not Just an interpretation of Saussure's ideas, but an 
interpretation of Saussure's incompletely developed ideas. 
Tlu.s ~t attempt at I'eC01lStructin sane aspects of 
Saussure's thought bas an advantage over the 1200 otlier 
publl.ca.tJ.OnS devoted to understanding Saussure's Cl.G (see Koemer 
1971). The advantage is that tlus investigation follows and makes 
use of Godel's (1957) analysis of the sources used by editors in 
constructmg the Cl.G, of Engler' s crJ..tical edition of the Cl.G 
(Saussure 1967) Chereafter Cl.G/E), incluchng the complete set of 
Saussure's own notes on general lingw.stics (Saussure 1971) 
(hereafter Notes) .10 Furt:henIDI'e this present study takes 
advantage of I<oerner's (1973) thorough analysis of the origin and 
developmmt of Saussure's thought. 
'!he prmciple to be investigated is the p:clnciple of in-
variance of language as a social institution. Such a principle 
is mdubitably evident in Saussure's Cl.G. He defines~ 
as one of the objects of ll.nguistic investigation. la e J..S 
a social fact CCI..G/E 172), shared in an identical fas on all 
the members of the speech commmi.ty (C}.l;/E.57). la lan~ is 
an invariant or homogeneous obJect of study (Cl.G/E:43) ,ing 
composed of states in equilil>rium.. ''Un etat absolu (de la .. )
se ciefmit par l 'absence de ~ements" (Cfh/E: 229). In , 
there 1S no gainsaying saussure s position viz. the notion that 
there is an obJect of l.J.ngul.sti.c investigation which is socially 
shared and :invariant. 'lhese two key concepts, haIDgeneous 
language state and social s'haredness, are the distm.guishi:hg 
features of Saussure's la~· SO the task before us is not 
to decide whether la langueiSSocially shared and invariant but 
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why Saussure was conv:i.nced that la langue had to have these two 
characteristics 
A Homogeneous language state 
The Saussurean notion of homogeneous linguistic state is, 
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by far, more controversial than his notion of social sharedness 
Accorchngly that notion has been widely discussed and regularly 
criticized as an oversimplification Despite these repeated 
discussions, homogeneous language state is still a much nus~ 
understood concept, one in need of a more penetrating investigation 
The notion of language state forms one pole of the dl.chotOJey' 
language state/language flux Language states are investigated 
from a synchromc perspective while language flux J.S studied 
from a diaclU"omc perspective Where most European linguists 
of the 19th century employed a diachroru.c perspective to in-
vestigate language flux, Saussttr'e emphasized the logical, if not 
the pedagogical (Koerner 1973 293) priority of the synchromc 
perspective and the study of language states 
But Saussure's intention went far beyond an alter-
native to studies of language change His concern went much 
deeper than the wonis flux, evenements or motus {Notes p 26) 
Saussure was prima.rJ.ly concerned with the "historical" character 
of 19th century linguistics The notion ''lustorical 11 had a 
significance in that tJ.me from which we are now es·tralilg•ed. 
11HJ.storical11 in the latter part of the 19th century implied 
much more than concern with events through tJ.me "Historical" 
referred prl.1llaI'ily to a rigorous attention to empirical detail, 
"Historical studies were highly empirical particularistic studies 
{Koerner 1973 266, Parsons 1947 9) "Historical" defines a set 
of obJectives and methods not only in lmguisti<"...s, but also lll 
economics and biology roughly after 1825 (Foucault 1970 217ff) 
The obJective of "historical" studJ..es were markedly--Foucault 
{1970 218) says revolutionary--dJ..fferent from those of the 
previous century "The general area of knCMledge is no longer 
that of identities and dJ..fference, that of non-quantitative 
orders, that of uru versal characterization, of general taxonorma, 
of non-measurable ma.thesis, but an area made up of organic 
structures, that is, of internal relations between elements whose 
totality performs a function, it will shav that these organic 
structttr'es are discontinuous We see emerging, as the organizing 
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~inciples of this space of empiricities, Analogy and Succession". 
In the application of these principles there developed the clear 
dl.f femnoe between empirical particulaI'istic approaches which 
emphasized the discontinuous character of the object of study, 
i.e., ''historical" sciences, and the less particularistic but 
equally empirical studies bent on discovering "inte:rnal 
relatica." The term "descriptive" is reserved for these latter 
empirical but relationship-oriented approaches (Keemer 197 3: 276). 
The developnent of "descriptive" out of "historical" sciences 
is the SOUI'Ce of interest in systems viewed synchronically. It is 
a short step ftiam tlu.nking about systems of internal :relations 
to positing an abstract state in which such systems exist. 
As a maalt, the notion of unchanging states containing systems 
of internal :relations appeared in the works of nmerous scientists 
m the second half of the nineteenth century. F. Brentano 
(1973 *5, 195) a.dumbmted the distinction between genetic (read 
historical) and descciptive psychology in 1874.ll In 1887 
T. Masaryk distinguished two perspectives in the scientific study 
of language, in one perspective data are co-existent data, in 
the other the data are in flux. Baudouin de Courtenay as early 
as 1868 and lu.s student M. Kruszewski distinguished static and 
dynaml.c perspectives. Perilaps m:>st important, and m:>st mfluentJ.al. 
over Saussure (Koerner 1973 275) was H. Paul's (1891) :recogrution 
of a "desCI'l.ptive"+grammar of ~e states as a possible 
altei:mative to a strictly ''lustorical" app:roa.ch to language 
phenanena. What J.S important to recogruze in all tlu.s J.S that 
the dl.Stlllctl.011 between synch:roru..c and dl.achiau.c perspectives, 
between language state and language flux, is implied by the split 
between ''lu.storical" and "descriptive" approaches m the 19th 
century. Far from beJ..ng original m Sausstn"e' s linguistics, this 
cb.stmctJ.On was "m the air" before Saussure began thinking 
about general lingw.stics. 
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that is, defined solely by their relationship to other abstract 
UIUts Such a vowel system was closed, tightly integrated and 
ID a state of equilJ.brit.un Clearly the notion of system in 
equill.brit.un previsions the notion of language state and of a 
synchronic perspective (Buyssens 1961 21). 
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The synchroru.c perspective was :unplied by the notion of a 
system in equilibrium which Saussure developed in 1878, but 
Saussure was not able to explicate that :unplication JJIIJilediately 
Only after he had been stl.JTlulated by the works of H Paul, and 
perhaps T Masaryk and M Kruszewski, was he able to finally 
formulate the synchroru.c/diachronic dichotOIT\Y in 1894 (Notes p 23) 
This ovservation of the "descriptive" character of Saussure's 
early work and of hls having been influenced by his contemporaries 
is, according to Buyssens (1961) and Koerner (1973), a complete 
and adequate account of the development of the synchrom.c/ dia-
chronic distinction and of the notion of homogeneous language 
state in Saussure's thought Buyssens (1961 23) goes so far as 
to say that Saussure's notion of the synchromc is entirely 
based on the notion of system as it was developed in 1878 
Up to this point, there is no debating the excellence of 
the work of Koerner and Buyssens However, I am suspicious 
of the cla.J..Jil that the above account is not only accurate but 
also adequate Specifically, there are two elements Jill.ssing 
(1) There is no accounting here for the fact that Saussure was 
not JUSt a "descriptive" linguist. fus linguistics surpassed 
both the "hlstorical" and "descriptive" approaches (2) There 
is no consideration of the role of Saussure's serru.ological 
theory whlch, at least in iey reading of the Cl.G and of Notes, 
was an essential ingredient in the development of the notion of 
homogeneous language state. 
The aJ..Jil of the following discussion will be to show that 
Saussure surpassed "descriptive" linguistics prJ..IIJarily by reason 
of his semiological theory Moreover, I will show that 
Saussure's notion of language state and his synchromc/dlach:ron-
ic dichotonw are founded on the same principle as is his serru.o-
logical theory It will follow from this that if Saussure's 
notion of language state depends ID part on his serru.ological 
theory, as I propose, then it is a rather different notion from 
the concept of language state whlch was "in the air" elsewhere 
at the end of the 19th century 
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Saussure went beyond "descriptive" lingw.stics by laying 
the foundation far ''human" linguistics. Accotmting for the I'ise 
of the ''human" sciences at the end of the 19th century is the 
mam objective of Foucault's Archeology of t:he Human Sciences 
(1970). Speci:fically Foucault a:rguest:hat 0Ut of, and as a result 
of, the historical. sciences of the 19th century, then! developed 
?'adically new sciences of linguistics, econanics and biology 
in the 20th century. 'lhese new sciences aI'e distinguished by 
reason of their object of investigation, unique :in the history 
of science, i.e. , man himself. Linguistics, as a DkXlel of the 
newly emeI'ging ''human" sciences is concerned with systems and 
significa1d.on represented, not in consCJ.ousness, but in the 
unconsCJ.ous (1970 361ff). A human science of language "exists 
not JUSt whereveI' man is m question, but whereveI' theI'e is 
analysis-within the dlnension ~to the unconscious-of 
signi.fymg totalities which unveil to consCJ.ousness the condition 
of its form and contents." "'!be object of human sciences is not 
language, it is that being which, from the inter.Lor of language 
by whl.ch he is SUITOlmded, rep?'esents to himself by speaking, the 
sense of the words ar propositions he utters and finally provides 
himself with a representation of language itself (1970 • 353). 
I not only conC\n" with Foucault's desCI'1ption of the ''human" 
science of language, but I also suggest that Saussure had a heavy 
hand l.Il fashioning that ''human" sCJ.ence. We can reconstruct 
Saussure's novements towal:1Ci "human" lmguistics by a CBI'eful 
read1 ng of his Notes. 
UntJ.1 1894, Saussure coul.d conceive of only one obJect of 
llngul.stics, the language spoken by men. 'lWo possible pe:rispeO!i 
ti.ves could be taken with refenmce to that object (1) Language 
oan be treated as an empirical I'eality, a mass of lingual debI'l.S 
.fran di.verse sources, sanethmg like a gla.cl.al mrraine to which 
chfferent rocks and mate:cials have been dragged through the ages 
(Notes pp. 5, 16). With that empl.I'ical pel"Spective, only the 
methods of ''historical." linguistics were acceptable. 
"Tout dans la langue est histoire, c'est-:a.-dire 
qu'elle est m obJet (Cl'analyse) lu.storique et 
non (d'analyse) abstra.ite" (Notes p. 5) 
Everytlu.ng lll language is history, that is, it 
l.S an obJect for historical. analysis and not for 
abstract analysis. 
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In such an 11lu.storical 11 atorru.stic view the uru ts we call 
language and dialect are fictions 
" __ f ,, / "Les dialectes ne sont pas en n:!alite des unites 
def llll.es, qu' il n' existe pas geograpluquernent 
des dialectes" (Notes p 13) "Alnsi la langue 
qui n' etai t pas , nous 1' avons vu, un notion 
deflnie dans le temps, n'est pas davangage un 
notion definie dans l'espace" (Notes p 12) 
Dialects are not well-defined units in reality, 
geographically dialects do not exist 'Ihus 
language, which we saw is not a notion which 
is temporally defined, is neither a notion 
which can be spatially defined 
(2) Alternatively one rru.ght adopt a perspective characterized 
by a methodological abstraction '!hat is, the linguist can, 
for heuristic purposes, ignore -the empirical diversities and 
concentrate on the JJnaginary language states in which systems 
are to be found 
"Il n'y a que des etats de langue qui sont 
perpetuellement la transl tion entre (1 'etat de) 
la veille et celui du lendemaJ.n' ( vouloir) reunir 
un certain nornbre de ces etats sous un nom cornme 
celui de latin OU de francais represente la rneme 
(operation, offre exactement la~ valeur) que 
si nous opposons le 19e siecle au 18e (ou au 12e) 
Ce sont de vagues points de repere sans pretention 
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a evoquer l'idee d'un ordre de choses "(Notes p 11) 
There are only states of a language which are always 
the transition between the state of yesterday 
and that of tomorrow, seela.ng to Uillte a certain 
number of these states under a name like Latin 
or French represents the same sort of operation, 
has exactly the same value, as if we were to 
oppose the 19th century to the 19th or the 12th 
These are vague starting points without pretense 
of doing anytlung but offering the idea of the 
order of thlngs 
By either perspective, Saussure's linguistics was perfectly in 
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line with the ''desariptive" cbara.cter of the worl<: of empiriCJ.Sts 
llke Xtuszewsld and Paul. 
However after 1894, Saussure not only talked of language 
states, but he talked of them as ~ties, not as methodological 
abs't:ra.c'dons. '!be key to the hypolitatization of 1laru?ua.P:e states 
was the notion of la conscience des sujets pa::lants.12 ~ 
"Grande principe • ce qui est ?'8el dans un ~tat 
donn6 du langage, c' est ce dont les suje'ts 
parlants ant conscience, (tout ce dont ils on 
conscience et :cl.en que ce dont ils peuvent avol.l" 
conscience)" (Notes p. 19). 
Ma.jar principle: What is real in any given state 
of a language is that about which the speaking 
subjeats have a consciousness, everytlu:ng about 
which they haver a consciousness and nothing about 
which they oould have consciousness. 
"Que le langage soit, a chaque nonent de son 
existence, un pI'Od:uit histarique, c'est ce qui 
est evident. Mus qu fa aucun manent du langage 
ce produit historique represente autre chose ' 
que (le ccmptanis le dernier compranis) qu' accepte 
1 1 esprit avec certain symboles, c' est lA me ver.ite 
plus absolue encore, (car) sans Cce demJ..e:rt fait) 
il n'y aurait pas de langage. Or la f~ dont 
1'esprit peut se servir d'un symbo1e -- C'tant 
dame d'abord) que le sy:mbole Cne' change (pas)-
est toute une science, laquelle n'a :cl.en a VOll' 
avec les considerations lustomques. De pj:us 
(si le) symbole change, :Umnediatene:nt ~ i1 ya un 
nouvel etat' necessi tant une nouvelle application 
des l.ans um. verselles. Nous nO'l.mt'l.Ssons depuis 
bl.en des annees cette convictl.OJ'l que la linguistique 
est une science douJble, et si (profondement 
irremed.iab1e:nmit) double, qu'on peut Ca Vl'a1 dire) 
se demander si'il ya me nrlson suffisante pouri 
mamteru.r sous ce nom de ~e me um.te 
(factice)" (Notes p. 23). 
It l.S certainly evident that language at each 
THEORETICAL STATUS OF INHERENT VARIABILITY 
llDJ:tel1t of its existence is an historical 
product However it is also quite true 
that at any moment of a language tlus 
historical product appeara as sometlurig 
other than the arrangement, the rrost recent 
arrangement, which the :rmnd receives with 
certain symbols, for without tlus last fact 
there would be no language But the :rrenner in 
wluch the IIW1d makes use of a symbol--granting 
that the symbol is not changing--is a science m 
itself which has nothing to do with historical 
considerations Moreover, if the syrribol changes, 
J.JID'Il€diately there arises a new state reqmrmg a 
new application of universal laws We have been 
f osterJ.ng for some yeara noo the conviction that 
linguistics is a double science, so profoundly 
double that one might well ask if there is any 
real JUStif ication for contmumg to ma.intall1 
the name lmgw..stics for this artificial unity 
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If the linguist concentrates on 13. conscience des su1ets 
parlants, what was preVJ.ously abstract and :una.gmary suddenly 
becomes real, and what was previously real, nCM beoomes non-
existent In this "human" lmgw..stics, language states are real 
and language processes and changes are unreal As far as ''human" 
linguistics is concerned, changes and flux do not exist 
"En linguistique, les etats ont un raison 
organique (interne) la connaissance des 
ant~cedents historiques n'aide pas a 
comprendre (ou a fixer a aucun moment la) 
relation mterieu.i.-e du signe avec 1' idee 
Il (reste) essentiellement faux de croire 
que la langue soit (pas plus d'un certain 
c8te un obJect) histoI'l.que'1 (Notes p 23). 
l<nOW"ledge of anterior events does not help 
one to understand how to establish, at any 
moment, the internal relationship of a sign 
and an idea It remains essentially false to 
believe that la langye is, except from a 
certain point of view, an historical ob3ect 
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11la ~ chose qui frappe quand on etucb.e 
les fa:its de langue, c'est que pour le SUJet 
parlant le\JI\ succession dans le temps est 
inexistante, J.l est devant tm etatit(Cl.G/E 181). 
"'!he fl.I'St t1ung that strikes us when we study 
the facts of language is that theJ..r succession 
m tJ.ne does not exist as far as the speaker 
J.S concerned." (Saussure 1959 81). 
Changes do not exist m ''human" l.l.ngu:l.stics because there are no 
pn>eesses and no changes in the minds of speakers, only language 
states. A language state J.S, m:>re precJ.Sely, tm etat canscient 
(Notes p. 40). 
'llus conclusion that language states are real J.S not 
arrived at through either methodological abstraction or 
idealization. language states become real only when a 
li.ngw.st slu.fts hl.S attention fran language to the consciousness 
of speakers. Tlu.s s1u.ft of objects is not to be overlooked as 
sl.l.ght or msigru.ficant. The new obJect of mvestigation, 
provides the foundation for a new science, racb.cally distmct 
from e:i.ther the "historical" or "descriptive" science wlu.ch 
preceded it, a science which Saussure lwnself calls semiology, 
the science of conventl.Oilal signs. 
"Dans la J.a:ngue, c'est aux etats, et a ceux-ci 
seuls, qu'appartient le pouvoir de signifier, ••• 
la 1angue hem de ce pouvoir signifier 
cesaerai t d' et:re quoi que ce soi t ••• Tout fai t 
statJ.que est par opposi ti.on aux fai ts cb.ach:roru.ques 
accompagne de sigm.fication (et par Ia d'tm aut:re 
caractere fondamental.)" (Notes pp. 27 ,28). 
In la 1angue, the power of signification pertams 
to states and to states alone, ~ ~ outside 
of tlu.s power of sigruf icatl.011 would cease to be 
what it is ••• Eve:ry static fact J.S by opposition 
to cb.acbrom.c facts a.ccx:mpam.ed by signification 
and by that has a fundamentally cb.fferent character. 
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We can understand the nature of Saussure's semiological 
l.J.ngul.stics only after we understand why he shifted his 
attention from language to the speak:J..ng subJect F:trst, 
language states remain fictions until we investigate the 
mind of the speaking subJect There language states are 
the only 1.J.ngw.stic realities. Secondly, sigru.fication 
pertains only to language states Therefore serniological 
lJ.ngw.stics, which seeks to understand the paver of 
sigru.fl.cation, must begin wrth the proper locus of real 
language states That proper locus is not language 
but the speaking subJect's consciousness of language In 
Saussure's words, the distinct science of serniological 
ll.ngul.stics seeks to discover "la faqon dont l'esprit se 
servir d 'un symbole" (Notes p 2 3) 
The first principle of senuological linguistics is 
that hUIIlClll consciousness of a senuological obJect is 
categorical. Saussure is making a very strong claJJit 
here, not about language, but about the nature of hwnan 
consciousness Obviously he cannot support this clalln 
by tu:rru.ng to other lJ.ngUJ.sts, because none of his 
contemporaries recognize "la conscience des SUJets 
parlants" as an obJect for study Instead he turns to 
philosophers and psychologists to support his serniological 
theory 
11 Il reste essent1elleire:nt faux de 
croire que la langue • soit. un 
ob] et histor1que la cause? Elle 
est bien SJJDPle. Des phJ.losophes, 
des psychologues ont peut etre 
pu nous apprendre quel etait le 
contrat f onda.mantal entre un 
symbole convent1onnel et 1' esprit'' 
(Notes p 23) 
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It ~ essentiall;y false to believe that 
language is an h.l.storical object. '!he :reason? 
It is very simple. Philosophers, logicians and 
psychologists may be able to tee.ch us about the 
fundamental tie between a conventional symbol and 
the mind. 
Sumarizl.ng the developient of the notion of language state, 
I suggest that l<'oemer and Buyssens are quite cozwrect in observing 
that the natl.Oil of language state is impll.ed by the notion of 
language system which Saussure developed m 1878. FurthenIDre, 
they are cor.reot in notJ.ng that other "desariptive" llnguJ.Sts had 
dl.scussed the dl.stJ.nCtion between synchrony and dJ.achro.py, between 
the study of states and the study of flux. '!he study of language 
states was "m the air" and Saussure certainly ma.de use of this 
concept developed by his "desariptive" contemporaries. But this 
account is incomplete m that it fails to expla.J.n hcw Saussure 
surpassed the "desariptive" science of linguistics. 'lherefore, I 
have added to the above account the observation that Saussure rec-
ognized that language states are realities, and not JUSt ideal, za-
tions, in the COilSCl.OUSiless of speakers of a language. He fashioned 
his sy.nch:roru.c l.J.nguistics as a science of the minds of speakers. 
Tlu.s new obJect of llnguJ.Stics is the foundatl.Oll for Saussure's 
semLological ll.ngw.stics, the goal of which is to discover the 
marmer m which hum:m consciousness accepts and makes use of 
conventional signs. 
'lhe history of the developnent of the Sa.ussurean notion of 
langUage state is nCM a.lloost complete. What remains is to dis-
cover the sou:roes of Saussure's semJ.ological theory and especially 
of the fundanental focus on the speaking subJect. Not much can be 
said with certainty about the sources of Saussure's SemJ..ology beyond 
traCl.Ilg the notions of arbitrarmess and aonvent:ionall.ty of signs 
to W.D. Whitney. '!he reason is that Saussure treated the nature 
of a semiological science in only a few scattered passages. 
Koerner (1973 330) stm1S up the situation by saying that "where the 
semiological nature of language m geneeal is concemed, we are 
not yet in a positl.Oll to give an adequate picture of the evolution 
of this idea m Saussure.' s l.J.nguistic thought." 
The only hmt which Saussure offers as to the source of his 
semiology is his suggestions that 11plulosophers, psychologists, 
and logicians have taught us about the fundamental contract between 
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the nund and conventional signs11 (Notes p 23, '+8) There is no 
saymg precisely who these philosophers, psychologists and logi-
cians are, the way is open fO!' conJecture Given this uncertalll-
ty of our knowledge, it may be helpful to point out some remark-
able resemblances between some of the most essential principles 
of Sa.ussurean linguistics and some of the principles of Franz 
Brentano' s phenomenological psychology. I do not intend to claim 
here that Brentano's Psycholo~from an llnpir1ca.l Stan~int 
actually :mfluenced Saussure, ough suCh a claim is p usible 
on three counts (1) T Masaryk, who Koerner argues (1973 270) 
may well have st:u:nulated Saussure to explicate the synchronic/ 
diachronic distinction, was close to Husserl and was strongly 
influenced by F Brentano (Jakobson 1970 l'+) (2) G Hegel, 
who may be the ultimate source of Saussure's notion of structure 
as composed of negatively defined elem:nts (Koerner 1973 5) , 
developed a "phenomenology" which was analogous to, though more 
abstract than, Brentano's It is plausJ.ble to suggest that 
Saussure was interested in Hegel's "phenomenology" and was led by 
that mterest to exa.nune the phenomenological psychology of 
Brentano ( 3) "phenonenological" approaches to the study of 
human behavior were "m the air" at thl3end of the 19th century as much as were "descriptive" approaches. 
These three observations would render plausJ.ble the claim that 
Saussure was influenced by Brentano, but I will sidestep such a 
claim for want of a farm historical corroboration. I will1!;'3'ther disregard the actual historical events and even chronology and will 
be satisfied mstead to explicate a few ma.Jor similarities between 
the phenomenological psychology of Brentano and Husserl and the 
general lll1gU1Stics of F de Saussure My aim is thus to lay a 
gnJund work for some later attempt to discover the actual historical 
link between Saussure and Brentano. 
Very briefly the phenomenological psychologists, Brentano and 
Husserl, share wrth Saussure the following principles (1) Psych-
ology /linguistics must be a rigorous empirical science. Re 
phenomenology, this characteristic distinguishes Husserl's pheno-
menology from Heidegger's hermeneutics (Palmer 1969 127). Re 
l.lilgul.stics, this principle accounts for the formal and impersonal 
character of Saussurean and post-Saussurean linguistics noted by 
Hymes (197'+ lll-7) (2) The obJect of scientific investigation 
lies in thenatural attitude of the speaker For Husserl, the world 
as naively experienced constitutes the starting point for invest-
igation (Natanson 1973 9) We have already illustrated the :unport-
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ance of the mind of the speaking subject as a groundJ.ng for 
Saussure's notion of language state. C 3) '!he psychologist/lm ... 
gw.st makes no j~ts about the ontological status of the con-
tent of that natural attitude. Just as Brentano (1973 77-97) 
took nental phenomena to be realities to be :iinvestigated, so 
Saussure accepts the consciousness of the speaking subJect as the 
real obJ ect of senu.ological linguistics. (4) Mental phenomena 
lack temporal.J.ty. Ifusserl came to "deny the temporall.ty of bel.Ilg 
itself and assert a realm of ideas above the flux"(Palmer 1969 127). 
Saussure, of course, argued (CU3/E 181) that as far as the speak-
l.Ilg subJect was concerned, change was non-existent. (5) Science 
proceeds by description, descriptJ.On constitutes new knowledge by 
"unfold.ulg elements so far iug;>licit and below the level of aware-
ness or consciousness yet withlll experience" (Verhaar 1973 380). 
For Husserl and clearly for Chomsky, description is explanation. 
( 6) Psychology /lingw.stics is "anti psychological". More precise-
ly, wlule eeha.vioristic psychology is constantly loola.ng for the 
external stl.lIIU.l.l. which dete:rnune behaviors, phenomenological 
sciences look to describe and expliea.te just what is wi thlll the 
natural attitude of the subJect. (7) Psychological/l.J.nguJ.Stic 
descriptions regularly explicate structures (Verhaar 1973:386), 
structures which lie below the conscious awareness of the subJect. 
I have.'..listed these traits to show how closely Saussure's 
obJect and method of l.J.nguJ.Stic research parallel the object and 
method of a phenomenological psychology. By reason of this paral-
lel we can recognize m Saussure's l.J..nguJ.stics at least an analogue 
to phen.anenological psychology. Saussure's ll.nguistics is clearly 
"phenonenologica.1" though not necessarily directly derived from 
Bre.ntano's phenom:mological psychology. 
'Ilu.s observation of the "phenomenological" "frame of refer-
ence" of Sa.ussurean l.J.nguJ.Stics is controversial, but hardly un-
precendented. H. Pos (1939, 1957), M. Merleau-Ponty (1960 105)15, 
R. Jakobson (1970 102), and J. Verhaar (1970, 1973) have all 
pomted out the "phenomenological" character of post-Saussurean 
ll.nguistics. For exanple, Pos cooments on the nature of "lumen" 
l.lllguistics by saying 
"Remarquons qu'en generar les sciences humains ont 
intere"'t particulier a l' application du pomt de vue 
ph~logique. Cet int~t repose sur le fait que 
l'hoJiile est deJa l'obJet d'un savoir avante toute 
science par le fait de la conscience qu'il a de lui-
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meme et par la f acon dont il se conqoit la 
science qui vient se suraJouter rencontre chez 
lui une conna.issance deJa presente 11 
537 
It can be said that in general the human sciences have 
a special interest in the application of the 
phenoJJEnological perspective. 'Ilus interest lies 
in the fact that man is already the obJect of knowledge 
before the advent of any science by reason of the 
consciousness which he has of lumself and by the manner 
ID which he conceives of hl.mself the science wlu.ch 
adds itself to the srtuation finds in h.JJn a knowledge 
already present. 
It is prJ.m3I"'J.ly by developing a lJ..ngUistics with a "phenomenolo-
gical11 "frame of reference" that Saussure surpassed "lustorical" 
and "descriptive" lJ..ngUistics. His ll.11gU1Stics was a ''human11 
science and in that it shared certain characteristics with other 
budding "human11 sciences. Saussure hl.mself recogruzed that af fin-
i ty of his "human" linguistics to "human" economics even in his 
own day 
B Language as Social Fact 
By way of re-orientation our obJective has been to uncover 
the notivation which led Saussure to postulate language states 
and social sharedness ID order to evaluate the criticisms of the 
11traditional.11 linguistics by members of the quantitative -paradigm 
We have JUSt concluded the analysis of the Saussurean concept of 
language state To complete our evaluation of these criticisms 
we JID.lSt also examine the notion of social sharedness In this 
section we will explicate this notion of social sharedness and re-
veal some of the stumblmg blocks hidden witlun it 'Ilus treatment 
of the concept of social sharedness will be rather abbreviated in 
comparison to the treatment of the notion of language state since 
it has been discussed adequately and in detail elsewhere 
(Washabaugh 1974, Koerner 1973 224-237) 
(1) "Il faut une masse parlante pour qu'il ya.it une 
langue. • Contra.J.rement a 1 'apparence, qu 1 elle est 
une phenomene sooologique Sa nature sociale est 
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une de ses caracteres mternes 
(CI.G/E:l72). 
"For the realization of language a 
camunity of speakers is necessary ••• 
Contrary to all appearances, language 
neveri exists apart from the social fact, 
for it is a semiologioal phenanenon. 
Its soc:dal nature is one of its inner 
characteristics" (Saussure 1959 77). 
(2) "La linguistique synchron:i.que s 'occuper 
des rapports logiques et psychologiques 
rel.J.ants des tennes coexi.stants et 
fonnant systemes1 tels qu'ils sont 
a.pericsus par la mI!!ne conscience collective." 
CCLG/E 227). 
"Syncbroru.c l.ingu:istics will be concerned 
with the logi.Cal and psychological 
relations that bind together coexisting 
terms and form a system in the oollective 
Jllllld of speakers" (Saussure 1959 100). 
( 3) "La langue existe dans la collectivttt 
sous la forma d'une sonme d'empreintes 
Clepost{es dans cha.que cerveau a peu pres 
ccmne un dictionna.l.Tie dont tous les 
exempla.J..res, identiques, seraient 
repartJ.s entre les individus" (CLG/E 57). 
"Language exists m the fonn of a sum of 
impressions deposited in the brain of each 
member of a COl1llllll'll. ty, al.Jmst l.J.ke a 
dictionary of Which identical copies have 
been dl.st:Mbu~ed to each mdJ.vidual. 
language masts m each mdJ.vidual yet i't 
J.S camon to all" (Saussure 1959 19). 
In whatever passage you ~, SausstlZ'e 's la ~ is 
socially shared. But the notion of the sharedness seems to 
vary :11i~· Quotations (1) and (2) suggest a superorgan.ic 
sharing , that J.S, the social sharedness of la ~ is in 
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same way prior to the realization of la langue m each 
md.J..vidual. The terms social fact andcollective lillJld bend the 
reader's IIDnd to DurkhelJR and to lu.s notion of the sharedness 
of "social facts " DurkhelJR says that "the obJection ma.y be 
raised that a phenomenon is collective only if it is comnon 
to all members of a society, if it is truly general This may 
be true, but it is general because it is collective and 
certamly not collective because it is general" (1938 9) 
On the other hand, quotation ( 3) "WOuld lead us to believe that 
la langue in the consciousness of each ind.J..vidual has some 
priority and that the sha:redness is the result of the pooling 
of the ndepos1 ts'' in each ind.J.. vi dual In that case, as Wells 
(1947 29) has accurately observed, "one language, like a 
perfectly pure chenu.cal, is nowhere to be met with in experience, 
but is an idealized construct designed to make explanation 
practicable " In other words, language states really exist m 
ind.J..viduals, but one can question whether they really exist in 
social groups, since always and everywhere, groups are hetero-
geneous It would seem that if we accept the notion of 
share.dness in ( 3) then we are ul t:unately led to deny the 
reality of socially shared horrogeneous language states 
The confusions will not be erased by protracted henneneutical 
arguments Let us face the fact that Saussure's words are 
confusing and his ideas about sharedness must still have been 
developing There is good reason to believe that Saussure's 
concept of la langue,particularly the nature of the sharedness 
of was an unfJ.nJ.shed concept For one thing, Saussure 
began to with sharedness ·when he taught his first course 
in general linguistics (1906-07) It is therefore a much rrore 
recent concept than language state which dates from at least 
1894 Secondly, in each of the three courses he taught, 
Saussure revised lu.s notion of sharedness In the first course 
he stressed the psychological reality of la langue, in the 
later two courses he1gmphasized its social-sharedness with increasing strength If Saussure had taught a fourth course 
he would probably have altered his not1~n of social sharedness 
of la ~ again (Koerner 1973 237) 
Saussure left his notion of social sharedness in an un-
certa.J..n and shaky cond.J..tion That uncerta.J..nty is particularly 
apparent when Saussure's d.J..scussions of sharedness are 
contrasted with lu.s d.J..scussion of language states, the older 
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fl.l.'!I2r concept. l1Y aim nexie is not to reVJ.Se th.at notion, but 
only to pomt out that if the?;'le is a. problem in Saussurean 
llnguistics, it is likely to be a problem with the weaker 
concept, sbare.dness, not with the strongeri one, language state. 
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I>/ Evaluating the Notion of Inherent Variab1lrty m the 
Light of the fu.story of Lmguistics 
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I.abov and other proponents .:>f the quant1tat1ve paradigm 
have mdicated, on a number of occasions (WI.H, 1.abov 19 72) , that 
it is theJ.r mtent1on to rev1se the Saussurean paradigm We 
have seen, in Sect1on II, that those revisions have led to the 
formulat1on of the principle of innerent variability In this 
sect1on I will pay close attention to those aspects of the 
Saussurean paraaigm which have been taken t0 task by quantitativ-
ists. More exactly, the aim of the following discuss1on .is to 
exanu.ne the quantitat1vists position with regard to the issues 
of sharedness and language states , Saussurean. principles about 
wluch we now have a rather clear understanding The conclusion 
of tlus discussion w1ll be that quantitativists have criticized 
the wrong concept 
Quantitat1vists have repeatedly emphas1zed their concern 
with representing language as a social system "It is difficult 
to avoid the coII1I0n-sense conclus1on that the obJect of 
lmguistics must ultJ.mately be the instrument of communication 
used by the speech commuruty) and if we are not talking about 
that language, there 1s something trivial in our proceechng" 
(1972 187, see also 1.abov 1971108) G1ven this concern, they 
a.re rightly puzzled by the 11trad1tional" view that the social 
aspect of language can be investigated in a rather small 
sampling of indiv1duals of a society It is, they say, 
"paradoxical" to claim that the soc1al aspect of language can 
be satisfactorily described by examuu.ng e1ther the utterances 
or intw.tions of a few mdividuals But precisely what is 
paradoxical m tlus "traditional" view? Accord.Jng to 
quantitativists the problem hes in claJ.11Uilg that language 
consists of mvarJ..ant structures shared by all when in fact 
every language cornmuru..ty is heterogeneous and full of var1ation 
Invar1ance of structure 1s a fiction, languages are mherently 
variable and that accounts for the heterogeneity of the 
commuruty Since the commuru.ty is mherently heterogeneous, 
tne social character of language mu.st be mvestigated by 
exanuru.ng large representatJ.. ve samples of a cornmuni ty In 
other words, the problem with the "traditional" view hes, not 
so much m what is or what is not shared ll1 the comrrrunity, but 
w1th the not1on of language state as a set of categorical rules 
542 1975 MIO-AMERICA LINGUISTICS CONFERENCE 
'Ihe.y argue that social language states are Ulll"eal. because 
language states are unreal.. 'Ihis is the nub of the Sa.ussm:-ean 
paradox in the quantitativist<\s view • 
.Accordingly, quantitativists bave rectified the Sa.ussurean 
paxadox by pursw.ng analysis consistent with the notion of 
J.Dhe:rent variability. "T.he application of probability theozy to 
vaI'iable rules by Cedergt'en and Sankoff repz:iesents a dramatic 
success for those who would treat the speech camnmity as a 
coherent entity and confront linguistic variation directly instead 
of adJUSting data to an older categorical JOOdel11 (Labov 1973 85). 
It is primarily the notion of l.11hez:ient variab:Ll.J. ty which enables 
quantitativists to adequately describe language as a social fact. 
But m repudia:tmg the notion of mvariance and of language 
states, quantl.tatl.vists are depart:ing from the "phencmmological" 
"frame of I'E!ference" upon which the notion of langlJQe states 
is based. Recognl.zlng this departure fran a "phenomenological" 
ll.nguJ.stJ.cs reqUJ..res a z:ieading between the lines of the work of 
quantl.tatl.vists. For example, WUi Cp. 121) do not recognize 
that language state in Saussure's thought is quall..tatively 
different f:rom language state in the t1unla.ng of "descrJ..ptivists" 
like H. Paul. '!hey fail to see that while Paul's notion is a 
nethodological abstraction, an "average," language state for 
Saussure is a real.1.ty viz. the consciousness of the speala.ng 
subJect. If they did recogruze this, they could not bave so 
easily ascribed variability of competence to the speaJa.ng 
subJect, at least not without respond.mg to the phenouenologists' 
cl.alms that1§-wnan cognition is constituted of mvariant structures. If quanti tatiVJ.Sts did recognize the natural 
attitude of the speala.ng subJect they would knc:M, along with 
Bickerton (1975 184), that "choice of style is governed, not by 
any mter-subJectl.ve and obJectively perceptible features m a 
situational context, but by autonoloous and fluctuatlllg feelings 
of the speaker lumself or herself ••• It is not the si tuatl.on as 
obJectl.vely perceived by the observer, but the situation as 
subJectl.vely perceived by the actor, which constitutes the operant 
factor." FI1l:m these evidences, we conclude that the quanti tatl.ve 
paradigm departs f:rom not only the prmnciple of language states, 
but also f:rom the "phenomenological" "fnme of refenmce" on the 
basis of which language states were origmally posited. 
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Quantitativists argue that "tracb.ti.onal" ll.ngw.stic theory 
is paradoxical in that it attempts to find shared invariant 
structures where there are in fact shared patterns of variation 
They have Clli ticized the "tracb. tional 11 notion of language state 
but have ?§Cepted the "tracb.tional" notion of sharedness without 
mich ado. That "tracb.tional" notion of sharedness says that 
identical copies of a variable rule, though applied at different 
frequencies in the comnru:ru ty, are nevertheless cb.str.lbuted in 
basically the same fasluon as any categorical :rule And in fact 
a language boundary is sa.J..d to exist at that point to wlu.ch a 
variable rule cannot be extended The language camnu:ru..ty is 
defined as that collection of incb.viduals who share a set of 
identical rules, that collection of incb.viqtJa18 among whom 
there is same "replication of UIU.fornu.ty " 
Quantitativists reJect the "traditional" view of language 
states and accept the tracb. tional vieM of sharedness, tlu.s 
situation itself appears to be a paradox in the light of our 
lustoriograplucal investigation. Quantitativists have rightly 
observed that there are problems in Saussurean linguistics, 
namely that a socially shared language state l.S a fiction. 
But thl.S observation led them to revise not the weaker 
Sa.us~urean concept of sharedness, but the f:umer Saussurean 
concept of language states In so doing, quanti tati Vl.Sts have 
departed from the "phenomenological" "frane of reference" of 
"tr.acb.tional" l.J..ngw.stics wluch is in fact the foundation for 
the ma.Jor advances of "tracb.tional" linguistics over "lustorical" 
or "deselliptive" approaches Quantitativists have tried to 
:remedy the weaknesses in "tracb.tional" 1.J.nguistics by repudiating 
its most essential features. They have cured the illness by 
executing the patient. 
V Conclusions 
The notion of inherent variability, and therefore the 
quantitative paradigm itself, is suspect. It assumes a less 
easily falsiable view of the nature of human cogru.tion without 
first having falsified the stronger cla.J.m that cogru.tion is 
categorical. It points out a weakness in "traditional" 1.J.ngul.s-
tics but resolves that weakness in a paradoxical fasluon. 
It revises the solid concept of language state but igno:res the 
unstable one, social sharedness Moreover, in revising that 
solid concept, it deviates from the "phenomenological" "frame 
of reference" of "tracb.tional" lmgw.stics. All these 
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observations are reason to be suspi.cious of the Vall.di ty of 
inhennt varial>llity though not to Cb..scard the not:i.on. 
Quantitative ~es are, after all, descriptively ad.equate. 
'lhe variable rule is able to represent accurately the 
variability of phenanena. in the speech commmity. 
Inherent variability should only be cb.scarded when there 
is avail.able a right-minded revision of "traditional" linguistics 
Tlilhl.ch is also descriptively adequate. We already have an inkling 
as to what such a revision Should look like, it sho~d maintain 
the notion of language state but revise the notion of social 
sharedness. Such a revisJ.On should, like the quantitative 
para.d:Lgm., see a paradox l.Il the claim that the social aspect of 
J.anguage can :me mvestigated l.Il a small sampling of a language 
camamity. But such a reviswn should argue that homogeneous 
social language state& do not exist because there is no sOCJ..ety 
JJl wlu.ch a language state J.S sOCJ.ally shared by bel.Ilg present in 
an identical faslu.on :in all the l.Ildivid1.ials of the commmi.ty. 
Such an al tenlative to a quantitative paradigm which I have 
been descrl.bmg J.S not Just hypothetical, it has been proposed 
JIDre than once by more than one ll.ngul.st. In the fol.lCMJ.ng 
pages I will briefly outll.ng two exaptples of such a revJ.Sion, 
Ll.eb (1968) and Bl.Ckerton (1975). 
The fl.J1St such reVJ.Sion J.S Hans;;.HeinrJ.ch Lieb' s attempt 
to resolve sane of the confusion about the synchronic/diac.hroru.c 
perspectives t:lmJugh a reformulation of the axians of a lingw.stic 
theory. 'Dus particular refonnul.a.tion is mte:restJ.ng in that it 
is one of the few revisions of Saussurean lingu:tstics which has 
taken mto consideration the :?J'.'8Cl.Se natmre of the Saussurean 
distinctions (LJ..eb 1967). LJ..eb's "language sta&e" J.S consistent 
with Saussure.' s notion of language state and so WJ. th the notion 
of a synchromc study of language. However LJ..eb finds it 
necessary to reVJ.Se the Saussu:rean notion of sharedness wlu.ch 
together with language stage defines the obJect of ll.nguJ.Stics. 
It J.S an empl.rl.cal fact that language as "la samie des tresors 
de langue incb.VJ.duelles" does not fonn a language stage l.Il which 
there are no changes. "It can be shown that de Saussure. was 
aware of the (thJ.S) problem without' however' haVl.Ilg solved it 
(Lieb 1967· 34). 
LJ..eb' s resolution of this problem is to recognize that 
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is not a honogeneous unity but a complex of sub-stages each of 
which may have a Saussurean system, i.e , an invariant system 
The relationship of diachrony to synchrony is resolved in 
recogruzing that the succession of sub-stages through tJ.Jie is 
qualitatively the same as the Juxtaposition of sub-stages of 
a complex at one point in tJ..Jie As a result of this revision 
of the axJ...oms of linguistic theory, a synchronic analysis is 
acccmplished by a direct consideration of the heterogeneity of 
language in the commuru...ty. 
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Bickerton's DynaJill.cs of a Creole System (1975) is a second 
revision of the Saussurean notion of sharedness That revision 
is, in the end, similar to Lieb's though arrived at through 
analysis of empirical data rather than by logical rnaru.pulation 
of theoretical axJ...orns. Bickerton (1975 180) reJects the view 
that there are "large, stable, quasi-horrogeneous language 
comrm.uuties with rronoglot speakers" which constitute the obJect 
of lmgw.stic descriptions In other woros' the linguistic 
Jmowledge to be represented by a grammar is not shared in 
identical forms throughout the cornmu111 ty Rather, any speech 
cornmuru..ty is an orgaru.za.tion of multiple linguistic competences, 
a grammar of a language JIUlSt represent this heterogeneity by 
bel.Ilg polylectal More specifically, the linguistic variation 
in such heterogeneous speech commuru...ties as Guyana, Jamaica, 
and HawaD. demand that each individual in these corrmunities must 
possess a polylectal competence, such individuals have internal-
ized multiple irnplicationally arranged sets of categorical rules 
A complete description of the social language system of these 
COIIl!Illllllties will require a Juxtaposing of all the distinct 
polylectal gramnars in the coIIllIR.lill.ty. 
Both Lieb and Bickerton have recognized difficulties with 
Saussure's linguistics, they have attempted to revise that 
lmgw..stics by refashioning Saussure's concept of sharedness 
while maintaining the notion of language state To the extent 
that their revisions are empirically adequate--in that they 
can handle the variable and heterogeneous phenomena descrlbed 
by the quantitative paradigm--they are more acceptable than the 
quantitative paracb..gm Their revisions require no alteration of 
the rather long standing, not-yet-falsified view that h\.Dllan 
cogrution is categorical 
In conclusion, the quantitative paradigm has repudiated the 
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"phenaienological" 11frame of reference" of "traditional" 
l.l.ngUl.Stics and completely ignores the natural attJ.tude of the 
spealo.ng subJect. It has revised, without having fal.sified, 
the view tha.t human consciousness categorizes conventional 
signs in place of that "traditional" view of cognition, it has 
descr:lhed cognition as a probabilistic processor, a sort of 
devJ.Oe consistent with the notion of l.Ilherent variability of 
l.J.ngUJ.stl.c conq>etence. It has rejected the notion of 
categorical language state, a fl.rm Saussurean concept, but it 
has accepted the rather tmStable view that language nn.ist be 
socu.ally shared by being distributed 1Il an identical f aslu.on 
aJWng all members of a COJillilUIU.ty. These deficits would not 
automatically require the rejection of the descriptively 
adequate quantitative paradigm were it not for the fact that 
there are alternative less paradoxical revisions of "traditional" 
l.J..ngw.stics which are descriptively adequate. 
NOTES 
1. '!he term quantitative paradigm is used here to refer to that 
set of l.J.ngui.stic pr1I1Ciples, and/or that group of llnguJ.sts 
who espouse that set of linguistic prJ.nCiples, outlJ.ned by 
G. Sankoff (1972), l.abov (1972), and Wolfram and Fasold (1974). 
2. "Tm.ch.tional" refers to the Saussurean-Chamskyan paradigm. 
'!here is a precedent and rationale for treating these two 
schools of ll.ngul.stic thought as a uru.t (Koerner 1973 13). 
3. I could JUSt as well have borrowed Koerner's (1972 259) tenn 
"cl.1mate of opiru.on" which "denotes the particular J.ntellec~ 
tual. atJoosphere prevailing at a given period of tJJD.e." 
4. Variation here means alternation between phonological variants, 
ioorphologica.l variants, or syntactic variants. For example, 
in Anerican English, variation is COJillOOnly fO\.llld between fl.rs' 
and fll'St, and between not ••• any and not. • none. "'lraditiOnal" 
bngw.sfacs has usually treated these alternations as arbitrary, 
that is, as either free variation or as dialectical differences. 
5. In fairness to generative ll.nguistics it should be poIDted out 
that labov's criticisms of Chomsky are same.what off the mark. 
Labov, Yaeger & SteJ.ner (1972 269) clalm, for exarrg;>le, that 
Chansky's obJect of 11Ilguistic J.nvestigation is "the speaker's 
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mtrospective Judgments." But Chomsky has stated clearly 
enough that the obJect of lmguistics is "the l.J..ngui.stic 
mtuition of the native speaker (1965 26). Dore (1971) has 
pomted out that there is a world of d.1.f ferences between 
mtuitions --- llIIIIledl.ate and non-discursive knowledge ---
and mtrospective Judgments wlu.ch are m fact new behaviors, 
mdependent of, but supposedly based on, mtuit1011s. For 
labov to show that mtrospective Judgments are variable is 
to show nothing about the nature of linguistic mtul.tion, it 
is only to pomt out weaknesses in the method of explicating 
11.IlgUl.stic mtui tions (cf. Greenbaum 19 7 3) 
6. According to Wlli (p. 167) V. Mathesius of the Prague School 
is a notable exception to this generalization. Mathesius 
(1964) whose lmguistic obJectives if not methods are 
emulated by WUI, recognized the variability or potentiality 
of 11.ngw..stic phenomena m a cOII11J1UIUty. But what Will do not 
mention is that Mathesius proclaims his study of the potenti-
ality of lmguistic phenomena to be individualistic and not 
sociological. Mathesius considers it to be part of lu.s task 
m describing variability to overcome the "anti-mdl.vidual-
istic" bias of 11.ngw..sts and "the one-sided ~ha.sis that 
they lal.d on the social character of language" (1964 26). 
Such an obJective is hardly m lme with tl1e quantitativists' 
a..1J11 to describe the social character of language -
7. Tlus implication can be debated, though I do not have the 
space to give the issue fall' shrift here. To indicate the 
lllles of the debate I would Sl.II!ply point out that Saussure, 
in discussing the speaker's consciousness of a sernJ..ological 
obJect wlu.ch is arbrtrary and conventional. He claJ.JilS 
that human knowledge of that obJect is hom::>geneous, he 
makes no cl.aJ.ms about the character of hunan knowledge 
of any other obJect 
8. Specifically, the test employs a binary series of "two 
discrete events with constant probability over trials. 
The event occUITing on any trial is mdependent of events 
occurring on other trials m the series" (Lee 1971 145) 
9. Where the occUITences of X and -X are random and where X 
occurs m::>re than half the time, the optllilal strategy should 
be to select X on every trial. 
548 1975 MID-AMERICA LINGUISTICS CONFERENCE 
l.O. See 1IrJ review of Notes (Washabaugh 1975). 
11. Both Lieb (1967) and Koerner (1973.273) fmd Brentano's 
d.1.stinctian too vague to have had any influence over 
Saussure. 
12. Koerner (1973 264) l.5 a bit unfair in his critiCl.SDl of 
Stephen Ullmann's state.urant that "syn.chronic l..ingu.istics 
is JIWJre aldn to the attitude of the ordinary speaker." 
Koerner ignores the ~e principe (Notes, p.27) and cl.alms 
lllStead that the le SUJet: ~l.ant never became a concept in 
Saussure's theory. AdiDitt y the concept of le SUJet 
parlant remains :implicit in nruch of Saussure's theorizing, 
he avoids using the tenn. when it would seem to be JIDSt 
appropriate, e.g. , when discussing why lJ..ngw..si:ics and 
econam.cs are divided into syncbroru.c and diachroru.c 
sciences while other sciences are not (CI.G/E 177). 
Saussure relies instead an the role of valeur in the two 
sciences to account for the division. I suggest that the 
notion of valeur is, as part of Saussure semi.ology, 
in"bma.tely "liiiiid up with and dependent upon the notion of 
le s~ parlant. That notion remains llilphcit in, but 
cert y not absent from all the other semiological notions 
dl.5cussed m the CI.G. 
13. At the same tJ.me as Brentano was developing lu.s phenoneno-
logical psychology. Dilthey was developing lu.s "phencm3Ilo-
logical" hermeneutics (Palner 1969 98). The m:>tivation for 
both approaches was a recognition of a need for a science of 
the human which was quall. tati vely from a science of the 
natural. 
Dilthey's 11pheilOJIEilOlogy" had an JJDpact on the social 
sciences, particularly on M. Weber (Parsons 1947.9) though 
Saussure's linguistics shows no symptcms of having been 
influenced by that history-oriented "phenomenology". 
11.j.. Saussure could not, of course, have been influenced by 
Husserl whose work was largely published after Saussure's 
death. Jakobson (1970.14) argues, however, that Husserl's 
phenanenology did have a strong influence on the develop-
mant of the various post-Saussurean schools of llngui.stics. 
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15 Merleau-Pontyls (1964 216) notion of spealo.ng sub3ect is 
somewhat chffe:rent from, but certainly related to Saussure's 
notion of speak:tng subJ ect 11Flx>m the phenomenological 
point of vi.ew, 11 says Merleau-Ponty, "for the speaking 
subJect who nakes use of his language as a means of 
cOIIllIUJIUcating with a living comnum. ty, a language regains 
its UIUty " Merleau-Ponty is describing an obJect of 
investigation requiring an explication of the 1Illl1d of the 
speak:tng subJect, not JUSt as the locus of a system of 
signs, but as a participant in a living comnuru.ty RJ..coeur 
(1967) rightly points out that such a notion of speala.ng 
subJect is not apparent in Saussure's rigid dl.stmction 
between la lan~e and la parole Saussure sets aside the 
sub]ect as a living speaker and exanunes human consciousness 
only insofar as it supports a system of signs 
Rl.coeur' S' observations are accurate but deceptive, 
1.II1plying that the notion of speala.ng subJect J.S a refine-
ment which phenomenology has contributed to post-Saussurean 
ll.nguJ.StJ..cs. However, Saussure's explicit theory is built 
an the JJIIplicit recognition of the speala.ng SubJect as the 
obJect of investigation 'Ihe "pheno:irenological" nframe of 
reference" of Saussurean llnguJ.stics is not to be ga.J.Ilsaid 
by pointing out that he was not concerned with the speaker 
in the living conmu:ru.ty 
Saussure's followers give evidence of Saussure's 
"phenomenological" "frame of reference11 in the sorts of 
revisions they suggest. G Guillaume (1973 64-72) and A 
Sechehaye (1969) are certa.J.Illy trying to elaborate the 
concepts of la langue and la parole to include the study 
of the speaking subJect as a living functioning subJect 
But in so doing they see themselves to be explicating 
what is a.J..ready in the Saussurean franework rather than 
ma.Jang a radical al tera.tion of that framework or contribu-
ting a new basic concept. 
16 '!here J.S no evidence, however, that in emphasizing shared-
ness, Saussure reJected the psychological reality of la 
~· In other words, no clear support can be foundfor 
interpreting Saussure's sha.redness as akin to or derived 
from Durkhellll's notion 'Ihe ternu.nological slJlll.larities 
between Saussure and DurkheJ.lll lay a red her.r>ing ll1 the path 
of our understanding of Saussure's concept of sharedness 
(Washabaugh 1974 27) 
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17. I thmk that Saussure had a goal in quest of wlu..ch he wa.S 
mashioning h1.s notion of share.dness. 'lba.t goal is 
implicit in quotation (2) above. He was struggl.mg with 
the social processes, mvolving a camn.uu.ty of speakers, 
which account for the inter-subJective character of 
language, a necessary part of his semiology. Not oi'lly 
dl.d Saussure not arrive at a clear understa;nchng of 
processes which account for the inter-subjectiVJ..ty of 
language, but plulosophers, ll.nguists, and anthropologists 
are still struggl.J.ng with the problem ~flllkel 1967, 
Wallace 1961·26). -
18. T. Luckmann (1973.181) discusses the mvariant character 
of the naturaJ. attitude of the speaking obJect ''Measure-
nent of human a.ctions and their obJectivations must be 
based on a two-level account· of the invariant structures 
underlying typifications of social reall. ty and of the in-
variant structures underlying lmgul.stic articulation of 
hl.storically variant concrete typl.f ications of hunan action 
m human experienoe." 
19. Im.tl.ally, La.bov • s nab.an of sharedness had all the eannarks 
of Durldlel.Bll.ail superorganicism. He suggested that systematic 
relations could be found only in a COD1I111Uty of speakers 
not m mdl.viduals. In other words, like Durk'hel.m, Labov 
was claJ.nung that a language is general because it is 
oollective (Washabaugh 1974 28). Tlu.s superorgaru.c view of 
sharedness has smce been repudl.ated (Cederg&m & Sankoff 
1974, G. Sankoff 1972). It seems to have been replaced by 
a view wlu.ch is close to Saussure's, i.e. , an identical 
cow of a rule must exist m the JIIJlld of each speaker of 
a language. 
20. D. H;ymes (1971f.:75) pomts out that A.F.C. Wallaoe's notion 
of "repl.l.catl.Oil of urufonm.ty" is an apt characterization 
of the "tre.dl.tiona1" notion of sharedness. However, I 
mtend to shc:M that this is not the only notion of shared-
ness avail.able to structural. linguistics as H;ynes implies 
(19711- 79). 
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